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Information Sharing Among Banks About Borrowers: 
What Type Would They Support? 
 
Iván Major 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
I address the following issue in this paper: how does information sharing among banks 
about borrowers affect banks’ competition, and ultimately, the interest rate borrowers pay 
for the loan they take? One would expect that full information sharing among banks reduces 
lenders’ risk and results in lower lending rates than any other arrangement. This may be the 
reason why regulators of the banking industry would like to see full information sharing in 
most countries. I shall show below that the regulators’ expectation is usually not fulfilled. 
Full information sharing will result in higher lending rates than any other form of 
information sharing under fairly general conditions. 
Despite its lucrative features, banks are not always keen on supporting full information 
sharing. Information sharing only about bad borrowers is the fully rational banks’ dominant 
strategy if the proportion of bad borrowers is substantial. Myopic banks would opt for no 
information sharing if the proportion of bad borrowers is large. Fully rational banks would 
only choose full information sharing if the share of bad borrowers is small. 
Borrowers with good credit records, on the other hand, would prefer information sharing 
only about bad customers rather than full or no information sharing, for they pay lower 
interest rates under a black list than with any other form of information sharing or with no 
information sharing. 
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temporal choice; Banks; Financial institutions 
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Az adósinformáció megosztása a bankok között:  
melyik típusú adóslista a legvonzóbb  
a bankok számára? 
 
Major Iván 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
Tanulmányom arra a kérdésre keresi a választ, hogy miként befolyásolja a bankok közötti 
versenyt és végső soron a hitelfelvevők által fizetett kamatlábat a bankok közötti információ-
megosztás az ügyfeleikről? Azt várnánk, hogy a bankok közötti teljes információmegosztás 
csökkenti leginkább a hitelezés kockázatát, és így alacsonyabb kamatlábakat eredményez, 
mint bármely más információ-megosztási rendszer. Ez lehet a fő indoka annak, hogy a 
pénzpiacok szabályozó intézményei a világ legtöbb országában – így Magyarországon is – a 
teljes lista bevezetését szorgalmazzák. A tanulmányban bizonyítom, hogy a szabályozók 
várakozása általában nem teljesül. A bankok közötti teljes információmegosztás – 
meglehetősen általános feltételek teljesülése esetén – magasabb hitelkamatlábak 
kialakulásához vezet, mint a többi információmegosztási rendszer vagy annak teljes hiánya. 
A teljes listának a bankok számára vonzó tulajdonságai ellenére a pénzintézetek mégsem 
minden esetben támogatják azt. Amennyiben a „rossz” adósok aránya a hitelfelvevők 
körében jelentős, a profitjukat hosszú távon maximalizáló bankok az ún. „negatív listát” 
részesítenék előnyben. Amennyiben a bankok „rövidlátó” módon viselkednek – tehát a rövid 
távú profitjuk maximalizálásában érdekeltek – és a „rossz” adósok aránya a hitelfelvevő 
népesség körében magas, akkor az információmegosztás hiányát részesítik előnyben minden 
másfajta rendszerrel szemben. A profitjukat hosszú távon maximalizáló bankok csak abban 
az esetben támogatják a teljes lista bevezetését, ha a rossz adósok aránya alacsony. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: kockázat, hitelpiacok, asszimmetrikus információmegosztás, bankok, 
pénzintézetek 
 
JEL kódok: D81, D82, D92, G21 
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INFORMATION SHARING AMONG BANKS ABOUT BORROWERS: WHAT 
TYPE WOULD THEY SUPPORT? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main issue of this paper is as follows: how does information sharing among banks about 
borrowers affect banks’ competition, and ultimately, the interest rate borrowers pay for the 
loan they take? Information sharing about customers is an important specific feature of the 
banking industry. Namely, banks can access information not only about their own 
customers but about the customers of other banks, too. This fact has a huge impact on how 
banks operate in the financial market, how do they deal with lending risk and how do they 
price the loan they extend to borrowers. Some form of information sharing among banks 
about borrowers’ credit history is mandatory in most countries. One of the four possible 
types of information sharing regimes may be in place in a country: banks may share 
information about all customers (a “full list”), only about non-paying customers (a “black 
list”), only about good borrowers (a “white list”), or they may not share any borrower 
information at all. 
One would expect that full information sharing among banks reduces lenders’ risk and 
results in lower lending rates than any other arrangement. This may be the reason why 
regulators of the banking industry would like to see full information sharing in most 
countries. I shall show below that the regulators’ expectation is usually not fulfilled. Full 
information sharing will result in higher lending rates than any other form of information 
sharing or the lack of it under fairly general conditions. 
Despite its lucrative features, it may not always be in the banks’ interest to support a full 
list as I shall demonstrate. For instance, myopic banks with different market shares—that is, 
banks of different sizes that maximize short-term profits during two periods at maximum—
may have conflicting interests with regard to information sharing. We could witness this 
fact in Britain where four major banks launched a comprehensive information sharing 
scheme in 2006, but Barclays Bank Ltd., the largest competitor in the market refused to join 
(Prosser, 2006). Similar developments occurred in the US financial market in the early 
2000s where larger banks have been reluctant to share customer information with the 
credit bureaus and with competitors (Lazarony, 2000).1 
                                                        
1 In the late 1990s, with the concentration of retail lending, credit reporting in the United States 
started to change that required regulatory intervention Hunt (2002). I leave the analysis of these 
changes to a later paper. 
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The question this paper addresses is under what conditions would banks support full or 
partial information sharing about customers in private credit markets. I shall show that 
fully rational banks—that is, banks that maximize long-term profits—would only gain from 
full information sharing, if the fraction of bad borrowers is relatively low. But in case the 
fraction of bad borrowers is substantial, information sharing only about bad borrowers will 
be the banks’ dominant strategy. 
However, the deepest conflict lies between the interest of borrowers on the one hand, 
and the banks’ interest on the other, rather than among banks of different sizes. I shall show 
that, contrary to common wisdom, information sharing about all customers is not in the 
interest of borrowers with good credit records. They would prefer information sharing only 
about bad borrowers to any other form of information sharing, for bad information sharing 
among banks would result in the lowest interest rates borrowers pay. 
I shall assume strategic customer behavior and I show that strategic borrower behavior 
results in a different optimal information sharing strategy of the banks than what most 
papers on the subject outlined. I develop a simple three period model of oligopolistic private 
credit markets where banks serve unknown and known customers of different vintage. 
I shall discuss three related issues in this paper. The first question asks what the 
optimum pricing strategy of the banks will be under a given information sharing 
arrangement. The second question focuses on the issue what type of information sharing is 
the most beneficial to banks. Finally, I shall address the issue which type of information 
sharing is most beneficial to borrowers. My contribution to the existing literature on 
information sharing among banks is as follows: 
1. Known good customers of a bank pay higher interest rates than the bank’s 
unknown borrowers with information sharing only about bad customers (under a 
“black list”). The opposite is true under full information sharing: banks charge lower 
interest rates to their known good customers than to unknown borrowers. 
2. The interest rates known good and unknown borrowers pay with a full list will be 
higher than the respective interest rates under a black list. Consequently, good 
borrowers would prefer a black list to full information sharing among banks. 
3. Full information sharing may be the banks’ dominant strategy in the long run, for 
they can charge higher interest rates than with any other form of information 
sharing, and sharing customer information keeps the mass and fraction of bad 
borrowers small. However, myopic banks may opt for no information sharing if they 
serve a large fraction of bad borrowers in the current period, for these bad borrowers 
will go to other banks and depreciate the customer base of those banks in the 
subsequent period.  
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My findings that interest rates are higher under full information sharing than under 
other information sharing regimes, and known good borrowers pay more than unknown 
borrowers under a  black list are important both from a positive as well as from a normative 
perspective. On the positive side, they may contribute to explain why a large variety of 
different information sharing arrangements is in place in real credit markets.2 On the 
normative side, the main result of the paper could help to explain why mandated 
information sharing—imposed by parliaments or governments—is sometimes supplemented 
by voluntary information sharing agreements among banks. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: I give a concise literature review in section 2. I 
describe the assumptions and notations in section 3. I outline the model of banks’ 
competition in the private credit market with different information sharing regimes in 
section 4. Discussion and conclusions follow in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on information sharing among firms is very rich. But previous work on 
information sharing in private credit markets is not extensive. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) 
analyze a market with regional monopolies that existed in the past in the US. 3 They show 
that adverse selection of borrowers can be contained with information sharing among 
banks. Padilla and Pagano (1997) also focus on reputation games driven by the borrowers’ 
effort and welfare. The authors prove that moral hazard on the borrowers’ part can be 
controlled by full information sharing. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) argue that full 
information sharing eliminates adverse selection in bank lending. Padilla and Pagano 
(2000) show that moral hazard in borrower-lender relationship can also be contained by 
information sharing. This should provide the regulators and the banks with strong 
incentives to share information about customers but despite serious efforts of various third 
parties, including the World Bank, credit reporting on borrowers is slow to appear in a large 
number of countries (Miller, 2003). Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) use a two-period price 
competition model with borrowers’ switching costs to show that banks’ voluntary disclosure 
of customer information lessens the problem of adverse selection in loan markets and 
softens the banks’ competition for market share in the initial period. The authors do not 
explicitly state but it is obvious from their paper that they assume full information sharing 
even if the decision to share information is not necessarily symmetric among banks. They 
argue that banks will induce borrowers to switch between banks in the second period, and it 
                                                        
2 See, for instance, Miller (2003). 
3 Ausubel (1991) discussed the case of the US credit card market without engaging deeply in the 
analysis of information sharing. 
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ultimately relaxes competition among the banks during the first period. Bouckaert and 
Degryse (2006) revise their previous analysis and argue that banks may disclose only 
positive information about their own clients in order to deter entry. Gehrig and Stenbacka 
(2007) arrive at similar conclusions as Bouckaert and Degryse (2004), namely that 
information sharing among banks softens competition for market shares. They develop a 
two period price competition model á la Bertrand. The authors conclude that banks will not 
viciously compete for good borrowers in the first period if borrowers face positive switching 
costs whenever they change banks, and banks share customer information. The authors 
focus on the negative welfare effects of lenders’ information disclosure. They argue that 
information sharing hampers competition. Consequently, a fraction of good borrowers’ 
benefit will be converted into lenders profit through higher interest rates. I try to further 
develop the argument of Gehrig and Stenbacka and show that different information sharing 
schemes have different effects on customers’ and on banks’ behavior and ultimately on 
interest rates borrowers pay even without switching costs. Marquez (2002) arrives at a 
different conclusion when he shows that banks’ merger—a de facto information sharing 
arrangement—alleviates the problem of adverse selection and results in lower interest rates 
than a fragmented market. Dell’Ariccia (2001) delivers a similar conclusion. He shows—by 
using a multi-period spatial model—that the number of banks is endogenous when banks 
have asymmetric information about borrowers. He also demonstrates that—contrary to 
expectations—the more concentrated the loan market is the lower interest rates become. 
Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004) use a two-period price competition model to 
show that high quality borrowers are “informationally captured” and remain with their 
original bank without information sharing. Their main result is that information asymmetry 
softens competition for good borrowers. My conclusion is different in this paper: 
information sharing rather than the lack of it softens competition among banks, for 
information asymmetry among banks is the basis for a poaching market to evolve. Sharpe 
(1990) then extends the analysis to infinite periods in the framework of an overlapping 
generations model, but he assumes that banks offer the same stationary contract to each 
cohort of borrowers. That is, banks’ optimizing strategy is fairly restricted and borrowers do 
not act strategically in Sharpe’s model. 
Farrell and Shapiro (1988) present a dynamic price competition duopoly model (with 
switching costs) and they conclude that the two competitors change places in successive 
periods as “incumbent” and “entrant”, and the incumbent serves only its old customers—
who are locked in by switching costs—while the entrant serves the new customers. I propose 
a different approach than Farrell and Shapiro (1988). Information sharing rather than 
switching costs plays the role of a “lock-in device” in my paper. 
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I derive market shares of competing banks similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1998, 
2000) and to Villas-Boas (1999) who show that firms (banks) with smaller market shares 
will compete more aggressively for known customers of their rivals than larger companies 
(banks), especially in case firms (banks) cannot offer credible long-term contracts. But the 
above papers do not discuss information sharing and its impact on competition, what is the 
main focus of my paper. 
 
3. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS 
 
3.1 THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET 
Banks can operate under four different types of information sharing systems as I already 
described in the introduction. Each bank’s preference for the type of information sharing is 
conditioned on the amount of profits it can earn during three periods under different types 
of information sharing. Once all banks operate under a certain type of information sharing, 
this system remains in place for the future. Why is the banks’ view about the type of 
information sharing relevant if the actual form of information sharing is usually mandated 
by law in most countries? Banks’ opinion is important for they can largely influence the 
legislative process before the legal regulation about information sharing is enacted by 
parliament or by government. 
I assume that banks simultaneously set the interest rates for new customers at each 
period before these customers decide from which bank to borrow. Then—as in Villas-Boas 
(1999)—each bank observes the interest rates charged to unknown borrowers by other 
banks before it decides on the interest rate it will charge to known good customers. Banks’ 
pricing rule is common knowledge among banks and borrowers. Banks have relevant 
information about their known customers when they offer the loan. 
Customers are aware of the conditions of borrowing when they enter the market. Once a 
new customer learned the conditions of borrowing and signed a contract with a bank, there 
is no possibility of reneging on either side, nor can banks unilaterally alter the conditions of 
the loan. 
I define market equilibrium as follows: banks set interest rates for unknown borrowers 
and for known good customers. That is, interest rates are best responses to all other banks’ 
choice, conditioned on the state variable of the mass of unknown customers each bank 
serves in period t and on the customers’ type of being good or bad. Customers allocate 
themselves among banks, and market(s) clear in each period. Interest rates satisfy the 
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Markov perfect equilibrium conditions in steady state of the market. I define steady state as 
follows: the market is in steady state if neither the interest rates nor the banks’ market 
shares change in different segments of the credit market from one period to the other. That 
is, )()()( 1 kRkRkR tt == + and )()()( 1 ksksks tt == + , where )(kRt and )(1 kRt+ denote the 
interest rates bank k charges to a customer; )(kst and )(1 kst+ label bank k’s market shares in 
period t and t+1, respectively, while )(kR  is this bank’s interest rate, and )(ks is the bank’s 
market share in equilibrium (in steady state). 
The timing of the dynamic game among banks is as follows: 
1. The proportion of good and bad customersγ and γ−1 , respectively is known to 
banks and it does not change over time. Borrowers’ valuation v is also set when they 
enter the market. 
2. Borrowers know the type of information sharing among banks when they enter the 
credit market. 
3. Banks simultaneously set the interest rates for unknown customers.4 
4. Banks observe the interest rates for unknown borrowers and simultaneously set the 
interest rates for known good customers. 
5. Customers allocate themselves across banks accordingly and pay-offs occur. 
 
3.2 CUSTOMERS 
A mass of N customers borrows in the market in each period. I assume that the mass of all 
borrowing customers is normalized to two during one period. Each customer lives for 
exactly two periods.5 Hence, half of the customers—with a mass of one—enter the market as 
new and half of them—also with a mass of one—leave the market as old in each period. Each 
customer can borrow $1 per period. For simplicity’s sake, I assume that customers have an 
identical net valuation v of the loan.6 Each customer must place the amount of ψ   as 
                                                        
4 It would also be conceivable that a bank serves only its known good borrowers in period t and then 
leaves the market in period t+1. I shall disregard this possibility. 
5 The main conclusions of the paper do not depend on the fact that customers are present for two 
rather than for t > 2 periods in the market, provided that t is smaller than the number of banks. 
(Otherwise bad customers would drop out from the market even without any form of information 
sharing). 
6 I could have assumed different customer valuations, but in case all customers can borrow at 
uniform interest rates for the same group of customers, valuation will not affect the banks’ market 
share or the interest rates banks will charge. Consequently, I shall retain the original assumption. 
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collateral at the bank when she borrows that she can recover upon repayment. But a 
customer would lose this amount if she did not repay the loan with interest.7 
Customers are characterized by their preferences, that I assume to be quasi-linear, by 
reliability type—type can be “good” or “bad”—and by their valuation, and their history. A 
fraction γ  of the customers is “good type” and a fraction )1( γ− is “bad type” in period t. 
Customers’ type does not change over time. 
Lemma 1: A borrower is a “good type” if ( ) ( )ψδψδ tGtG
RR +≥→≥+− 101 , where 
ψδ G  is the discounted value of the collateral the borrower had to pay when she took the 
loan, tR  is the interest rate a customer pays in period t, and ( )tR+1  is the total amount of 
the borrower’s repayment obligation. That is, a good customer discounts future gains and 
losses with a large enough discount factor Gδ  (with a small discount rate Gr ) so that her 
benefit from repaying the loan exceeds the benefit of non-repayment. A borrower will be a 
“bad type” if ( ) ( )ψδψδ tBtB
RR +<→<+− 101 . Hence, good customers will always repay 
the loan, while bad customers never repay. 
The assumption that bad customers never repay is fairly restrictive. If banks did not 
share borrower information, or they shared information only about good customers, this 
would be a rational choice for bad borrowers since they can borrow and not repay in the 
initial period, then go to another bank and borrow without repayment in the second period. 
In case banks share full or bad information, bad customers can make a strategic choice 
whether to repay the loan or not in their first period. Consequently, the fraction of 
defaulting customers can be endogenously derived from the banks’ profit maximization 
problem. The financial market would be deeper if a fraction of bad customers repays the 
loan in the first period. But the deepening of the market will equally affect the banks’ 
customer base with bad and with full information sharing. Consequently, the conclusions 
about the impact of different information sharing schemes on interest rates would not 
change. Therefore I retain the original assumption that bad customers never repay, for it 
renders the analysis more tractable. 
I make the following assumption about customers’ choice of a bank: each new good 
borrower will choose one of two banks that operate in the market, based on his or her 
                                                        
7 I do not address moral hazard in this paper. I use collateral only as a separating device between 
“good” and “bad” customers, and I do not discuss its other implications. On moral hazard in bank 
lending see, for instance, Sharpe (1990), Padilla and Pagano (1997), and Padilla and Pagano (2000), 
Dell’Ariccia (2000), and Marquez (2002). On the role of collateral see, for instance, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). 
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preference for the banks’ services, and on the interest rates banks charge.8 I shall also 
assume that borrowers’ preferences do not change over time. I shall work with the 
assumption that customers’ preferences for banks, denoted θ  are uniformly distributed on 
the unit interval.9 
Since bad borrowers know that they will not repay the loan, their allocation across banks 
is random. I shall assume that bad borrowers go to banks according to the banks’ market 
share in the market for new borrowers. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence 
that the fraction of bad customers is almost identical across banks in most countries. (I 
could have assumed instead that half of the bad customers go to one bank and half of them 
to the other bank. This would have altered the formulas but not the substance of the 
analysis.) If banks share bad borrower information, the number of bad customers who 
borrow from bank k will be in period t: 2,1),1)(( =− kks yt γ , where 2,1),( =kks yt  denotes 
the market share of bank k in the market segment of “young” unknown borrowers in period 
t. If banks do not share bad information, each bank will receive more bad customers from 
the pool of bad borrowers than with bad information sharing, for all bad borrowers are 
unknown to the bank they borrow from. Consequently, the number of all bad customers 
who can borrow in period t will be )1( γ−  if banks share bad information, while in case 
banks do not share information about bad customers, the number of bad customers who 
will be able to borrow from some bank becomes )1(2 γ− . 
Good customers, who borrow and repay in both periods, maximize total utility over two 
periods: 
(1) ( ) ( ) 1,2;2,1,)()((),( 11 ==−−+−−= ++ jkjRvkRvjRkRu jtGkttt θδθ , 
where v  is the customers’ valuation of the loan, )(kRt and )(1 jRt+ are the interest rates of 
bank k or bank j in period t and t+1, respectively, depending on whom the customer has 
borrowed from in that period, ( )1,0∈Gδ  is the discount factor, kθ and jθ  measure the 
customer’s “distance” from that bank he or she actually borrowed from in period t and t+1. 
                                                        
8 The current approach could be easily extended to 2>K  banks by assuming that each customer 
will choose those two banks out of K banks that are closest to her preferences for banking services. 
Then the customer decides which bank to go to in her first period and in her second period in the 
market. I shall show in section 4.1 that the main conclusions of the analysis would also hold if more 
than two banks compete in the market. 
9 I could have assumed—as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)—that customers are distributed between 
banks k and j by the density function ( )θjkf , . The market shares of bank k and j would then 
become ( )*, θjFk  and ( )*,1 θjkF−  instead of *θ  and *1 θ− , respectively, where *θ denotes the 
preference of the marginal customer between bank k and j and ( )*, θjFk  is the cumulative density 
function, but it would have not modified either the analysis or any of the conclusions. 
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A bad customer will borrow and not repay in both periods if banks do not share information 
about bad borrowers. A bad customer’s pay-off then becomes: ( )vu BB ++= 1)1( δ . If banks 
share bad information, a bad customer can borrow either in the first or in the second period 
of his presence in the market. It is obvious that bad borrowers do not postpone their 
decision to take the loan until the second period, for the discounted value of their benefit 
would be lower than what they gain from borrowing and not repaying in the first period, 
which is vu B +=1 . Since only good customers can borrow in both periods if banks share 
information about customers, the relevant discount factor will be Gδ . I shall denote the 
discount factorδ to make the formulas simpler. I also assume that good customers and the 
banks work with the same discount factor. 
Finally, I assume that customers do not incur switching costs others than what they may 
pay in terms of higher interest rates if they switch banks. 
3.3 BANKS 
Two banks of different sizes operate in the private credit market in period t.10 Since banks 
can identify at least those customers who already borrowed from them, each bank is capable 
of distinguishing among known good, known bad and unknown borrowers. Consequently, 
banks can apply “behavioral price discrimination”—á la Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)—
between known good and unknown borrowers. Obviously, banks will not serve known bad 
customers. Hence, bank k’s gross benefit from extending a $1 loan to a known good 
customer in period t will be ))(1( kRGt+ , while it will be ))(1( kRUt+  in case of an unknown 
borrower if the loan is repaid, where )(kRGt  and )(kR
U
t  are the interest rates that bank k 
will charge to known good and to unknown customers, respectively. 
Banks’ cost from selling loans consists of two components: the loss inflicted upon them 
by borrowers who do not repay the loan plus the cost of funds and operation. I assume that 
banks have identical marginal cost of funds and operation and it is constant at c.11 For 
simplicity’s sake, I disregard banks’ start-up costs. I further assume that banks do not pay 
for the information they acquire about customers from a credit rating agency.12 
                                                        
10 I assume that no bank will drop out from the market and I also disregard the possibility of mergers 
between banks. 
11 The assumption about the banks’ identical marginal cost simplifies the analysis without affecting its 
main conclusions. If I assumed different marginal costs it would have resulted in the banks’ diverging 
market shares. I shall briefly mention this possibility in the paper when it becomes relevant. 
12 In reality, there is a moderate amount charged by the credit bureau to banks for each record they 
acquire, but I shall ignore this cost. 
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Banks are represented by their history, strategy and payoff. Banks’ history would be the 
infinite past in mature markets. But the knowledge a bank accumulates about customers 
during two successive periods becomes almost useless after these customers exit the market. 
New generations of customers will enter the market and information about each generation 
is relevant only for two periods. This is why I shall develop a three period model with 
overlapping generations. 
Bank k’s history consists of the mass of unknown borrowers and the mass of known 
good customers this bank has served in periods before period t. The bank’s strategy is a 
function that maps the bank’s history into prices for unknown and for known good 
customers they serve in the current period, ( ))(),( kRkR GtUt : 
(2) ( ) ( ) 2,1,)()(),( == kkhfkRkR tkGtUt , 
where )(kht is bank k’s history up until period t. 
Banks maximize profits through three periods by choosing interest rates for different 
groups of customers they are going to serve in each period. The bank’s payoff from a certain 
strategy is the expected discounted profit from pursuing that strategy given the actions of its 
customers, and the strategy of other banks: 
(3) ( )∑
=
==≠≠=
2
0
1,2;2,1,)(),()(),()(
t
G
t
U
t
G
t
U
tk
t jkkjRkjRkRkRk πδπ . 
 
4. LONG-TERM PRICE COMPETITION AMONG BANKS WITH AND 
WITHOUT INFORMATION SHARING 
 
After having outlined the modeling assumptions I present the models with different 
information sharing systems. It would be convenient but it is not feasible to compile a 
general model of banks’ competition with different regimes of information sharing. We need 
four different models to describe the banks’ competition with different information sharing 
systems because the demand for loans of the different types of borrowers will be derived in 
different ways under the four possible regimes. We start the analysis with “black listing” 
then we turn to full list. No information sharing and information sharing only about good 
borrowers will then follow. 
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4.1 INFORMATION SHARING ONLY ABOUT BAD BORROWERS (“BLACK LIST”) 
 
Banks know all bad customers who already borrowed, but they cannot distinguish between 
unknown good and unknown bad borrowers. There will be two separate but interrelated 
markets: one for unknown and one for known customers. Since I assumed that bad 
borrowers allocate themselves according to banks’ market share in the market for new 
customers, we only need to find the mass of unknown good customers a bank will serve in 
period t. 
Let us start with the borrowers’ problem. First, I describe the decision problem of those 
good customers who spend their second (last) period in the market.  
Lemma 2: An old good customer with preference θ  will choose her original bank k 
rather than bank j in period t+1 if and only if: 
(4) ( ) ( )θθ −+−≥+− ++ 1)()( 11 jRvkRv UtGt , or θθ −+≤+ ++ 1)()( 11 jRkR UtGt , from which we 
have: 1,2;2,1,
2
1)()( 11 ==+−≤ ++ jkkRjR
G
t
U
tθ , 
where )( and )( 11 jRkR
U
t
U
t ++  are the interest rates charged to unknown customers in 
period t+1, while )( and )( 11 jRkR
G
t
G
t ++ are the interest rates charged to known good 
customers by bank k and bank j in period t+1, respectively. 
Lemma 2 states that an old good customer stays at her original bank and pays the 
interest rate charged to known good borrowers if her consumer surplus is not smaller than 
what she could have attained had she switched banks and paid the interest rate charged to 
unknown borrowers by the new bank. 
Hence, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +− ++
2
1)()( 11 kRjR
G
t
U
tγ  good customers will stay at bank k and pay the interest 
rate )(1 kR
G
t+ , while a mass of ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= +++ 2
1)()(
)()( 111
kRjRksjs
G
t
U
ty
t
p
t γ good customers 
will go and borrow from bank j as unknown, where )(1 js
p
t+  labels bank j’s market share 
among “old” good customers, who come to this bank from bank k in period t+1. In other 
words, )(1 js
p
t+ is bank j’s market share in the “poaching market”, while )(ks
y
t is bank k’s 
market share in the market segment of young unknown customers in period t. (Obviously, 
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bank k gets ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= +++ 2
1)()(
)()( 111
jRkRjsks
G
t
U
ty
t
p
t γ old good customers, who leave bank 
j in period t+1.) 
The mass of those “old” and known good borrowers who stay with bank k cannot 
exceed )(ks ytγ , that is bank k’s market share among young unknown good borrowers: 
(5) 
2
1)()(
)( 11*
+−≥= ++ kRjRks
G
t
U
ty
t θ , or *1*1 1)()( θθ −+≥+ ++ jRkR UtGt , where 
*θ denotes the marginal young customer’s “distance” from bank k which equals bank k’s 
market share )(ks yt in the market segment of young customers, for we assumed thatθ  is 
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.13 Equation (5) implies that in case it is satisfied 
with strict inequality, bank j will poach a fraction of bank k’s good customers in the next 
period. 
Let us turn to the decision problem of the “young” unknown good customers in period t. 
Lemma 3: A young unknown good customer with preference θ  will choose bank k 
rather than bank j in period t if an only if: 
(6)  
( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ },)(;1)(max1)(
1)(;)(max)(
11
11
θδθδθ
θδθδθ
−−−−−+−−−≥
≥−−−−−+−−
++
++
kRvjRvjRv
jRvkRvkRv
U
t
G
t
U
t
U
t
G
t
U
t  
which can also be written as: 
(7)    
( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ },)(;1)(min1)(
1)(;)(min)(
11
11
θδθδθ
θδθδθ
+−++−+≤
≤−++++
++
++
kRjRjR
jRkRkR
U
t
G
t
U
t
U
t
G
t
U
t  
where, again,θ  denotes the customer’s “distance” in the preference space of all 
customers from bank k, )( and )( jRkR Ut
U
t are the interest rates charged to unknown 
customers in period t, while )( and )( 11 jRkR
G
t
G
t ++ are the interest rates charged to known 
good customers by bank k and bank j in period t+1, respectively. 
The marginal customer between bank k and bank j will be the person, who is indifferent 
between choosing bank k in the first period, and choosing either bank k or bank j in the 
second period, depending on the her second period net benefit, or choosing bank j in the 
first period and making a choice between bank j or bank k in the next period, depending 
again on which choice will provide her with the largest net benefit. Notice, that in case a 
customer switches from one bank to the other, she will pay the interest rate charged to 
                                                        
13 Had θ  had a distribution other than uniform, bank k’s market share in the market segment of 
young borrowers would become: ( )*)( θFks yt = , where ( ).F denotes the cumulative density function 
of θ .  
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unknown borrowers by her new bank, while the customers who stay with their original bank 
pay their original bank’s interest rate for known good borrowers, if there is no information 
sharing about good borrowers. The inequalities in (5) and (7) give the indifference condition 
for the marginal new good customer between banks k and j in her first period in the market. 
Since it follows from equation (5) that 
( ) ( ){ } ( )*1*1*1 1)(1)(;)(min θθθ −+=−++ +++ jRjRkR UtUtGt , we get the following indifference 
condition for the marginal new good customer: 
(8) ( ) ( ).)(1)(1)()( *1**1* θδθθδθ ++−+=−+++ ++ kRjRjRkR UtUtUtUt  
After rearranging equation (8) we have: 
(9) 
( )
1,2;2,1,
2
1
)1(2
)()()()(
)( 11* ==+−
−+−== ++ jkjRkRkRjRks
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
ty
t δ
δθ , 
which is bank k’s market share in the market segment of young unknown borrowers. 
Equation (9) gives the market share of bank k in the market segment of young 
customers in period t. 
How will old good borrowers, known to their original bank, choose the bank to borrow 
from in the second period? Before answering this question, I describe an important result in 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 4: If banks sold private credit to all of their known good customers, markets 
would be in steady state from the start. The interest rate bank k could charge to its known 
good borrowers becomes: 
(10) 1,2;2,1),(
2
1)()(21)()(21)()( ===⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−+=−+= jkkRkRjRjRksjRkR U
UU
UyUG , 
which directly follows from equations (5) and (9). (The upper bar stands for steady 
state values of the variables.) 
As shown in equation (10), banks would charge the same interest rate to their unknown 
and to their known good customers. Bank k’s profit on all of its known good customers then 
would become in each period: ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= ckRksk UyG )()()( γπ . 
However, a uniform interest rate cannot be a bank’s profit maximizing strategy if it can 
distinguish between unknown and known good borrowers. (See Proposition A1 and its proof 
in the Appendix.) Thus, bank k sells to less than the whole mass of its known good 
customers, and it will find the interest rate by solving its profit maximization problem with 
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regard to known good customers. Bank k’s market share among known (or “old”) good 
customers will be in period t: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
2
1)()(
)(
kRjR
ks
G
t
U
to
t γ . 
After having found the banks’ market shares in all segments of the private credit market, 
let us turn to the banks’ optimization problem.  Bank k will find the interest rate it 
charges to unknown customers from solving its profit maximization exercise: 
(11) { } 1,2;2,1,)()()(max 1
)(
==≠+≠+ + jkkjkjk UtUtUt
kRUt
δπππ , 
where 
(11a) 
( )
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
−+−−−−=
=−−−=
++
2
1
)1(2
)()()()()1()(           
)()1()()(
11
δ
δγγ
γγπ
jRkRkRjRckR
ksckRk
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
tU
t
y
t
U
t
U
t
 
is bank k’s profit from its new unknown borrowers in period t; 
(11b) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−−=≠ − 2
1)()()(;0max)()( 1
jRkRjsckRkj
G
t
U
ty
t
U
t
U
t γπ  
is the bank’s profit from old unknown customers in period t who borrowed at the other 
bank in period t–1; and 
(11c) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−−=≠ ++++ 2
1)()(
)(;0max)()( 1111
jRkRjsckRkj
G
t
U
ty
t
U
t
U
t γπ  
is the bank’s continuation profit from old unknown customers in period t+1. 
Bank k’s interest rate to be charged to its known good customers in period t obtains 
from: 
(12)  ( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= − 2
1)()(
);(min)(max)(max 1
)()(
kRjR
ksckRk
G
t
U
ty
t
G
t
kR
G
t
kR Gt
G
t
γπ . 
If banks lose a fraction of known good customers to the other bank they compete with—
and we have seen before that all banks will—then the interest rate bank k will charge to its 
known good borrowers becomes in period t: 
(13) 1,2;2,1,
2
1)(
)( ==++= jkcjRkR
U
tG
t . (This result immediately follows 
from solving the first order condition of the profit maximization problem in equation (12).) 
Lemma 5:   The mass of those good customers who borrowed from bank j in period t–1, 
and go to bank k as unknown in period t will be: 
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(14) 
.1,2;2,1
,
4
1
)1(4
)()1(
)1(2
)(
)1(2
)()(
)( 11
==
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−
+−−+−
−= −−
jk
ckRjRjRkRks
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
tp
t δ
δ
δ
δ
δγ  
The above result immediately obtains if we plug the result from equation (13) 
into )(ks pt  as defined above, which is bank k’s market share in the poaching market. 
After substituting the result from (14) into equation (11) that gives bank k’s profit from 
unknown customers, we get the first order condition of profit maximum in the market 
segment of unknown borrowers: 
(15) 
( )
.1,2;2,1    
,0
)1(2
1
2
1
)1(4
32
)1(2
)(
)1(2
)()1(
    
)1(2
)(
)1(2
)(
)1(2
)()3(
 
1
)(
)(
)()()(
1
1111
==
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++−
−++−−−
++
−−−+−
+−−=∂
≠+≠+∂
−
+−++
jk
cjRjR
jRkRkRkR
kR
kjkjk
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
U
t
γδγδ
δγγ
δδ
δ
δ
δ
δδ
δ
δ
δδπππ
 
The first order conditions give a fairly complex system of linear difference equations of 
third order on the interest rates banks charge to unknown customers in successive periods. 
But solving equation (15) for the equilibrium value of 
1,2),()()()( 11 ==== −+ jjRjRjRjR ttt  yields the following, less complex difference 
equation: 
(15a) 2,1,02
)(
)(
2
3)( 11 ==++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− −+ kCkRkRkR
U
tU
t
U
t δδ
δ
, where C stands for the 
constant terms in (15). I show in the Appendix that equation (15a) has a unique solution that 
is stable and it converges to steady state. (See Proposition A2 in the Annex.) Therefore, I 
shall present the results only for steady state. 
Lemma 6: Equation (15) simplifies to the following interest rates in steady state: 
(16) 
( ) 2,1,
)2(
)1(1
)2(2
)32()( =−
−++−
−+= kckRUB γδ
γδ
γδ
δγγ
, 
where )(kR
U
B  denotes bank k’s equilibrium interest rate charged to unknown 
borrowers under bad information sharing. Since ( )1,0∈δ  by assumption, the equilibrium 
interest rates give a unique solution for the banks’ optimization problem in steady state. 
Lemma 7: The interest rate known good borrowers pay will be: 
(17) γδ
δγγ
γδ
δγγ
)2(4
)362(
)2(4
552)( −
−++−
−+= ckRGB . 
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The above result obtains from substituting the )(kR
U
B from equation (16) into equation 
(13). 
The interest rates bank k charges to unknown customers ( ))(kRUB  and to known good 
borrowers ( ))(kRGB  will be a monotonous and decreasing function of [ ]1,0∈γ  under a black 
list. That is, unknown and known good borrowers pay a lower interest rate with a larger 
than with a smaller fraction of good borrowers in the entire borrowing population. This 
conclusion is in line with intuition. A more interesting result is that )(kR
U
B and )(kR
G
B also 
monotonously decrease with ( )1,0∈δ  at any reasonable values ofγ .14 At 0→δ , the interest 
rate unknown borrowers pay will be: 
(16a) γ
γ
γ
γ
2
)1(
4
2)( ckR
U
B
+++= , 
while known good customers pay the following interest rate: 
(17a) 
( )
γ
γ
γ
γ
4
31
8
52)( ckR
G
B
+++= . 
If 1→δ , (16) becomes: 
(16b) 2,1,1)( =+−= kckRUB γγ
γ
. 
Substituting (16b) into (13) gives the interest rates banks will charge to known good 
customers in steady state at 1~δ . 
(17b) 2,1,
2
)1(
2
1)( =++= kckRGB γ
γ
γ . 
Since interest rates decrease inδ , unknown and known good borrowers will pay the 
lowest interest rate at 1~δ . That is, a thriftier banking population will pay lower interest 
rates to banks than if borrowers heavily discount their future benefit. 
Another important result of the previous analysis obtains if we compare equations (16a) 
and (16b), and (17a) and (17b), respectively, as formulated in Proposition 1 below. 
 
                                                        
14 The condition will be as follows: )(kR
U
and )(kR
G
decrease inδ if ( )
c
c
25
12
+
+>γ . Since [ ]1,0∈c  
and γ  is increasing with c in the inequality, )(kRU and )(kRG will decrease inδ if
7
4≥γ , that is, 
the share of good customers is larger than 57 per cent in the total banking population at the extreme. 
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PROPOSITION 1. Banks set a higher interest rate to known good than to unknown 
customers under information sharing only about bad customers, )()( kRkR
G
B
U
B <  if 
( )
c
c
23
12
+
+>γ  whenδ is close to zero, and )()( kRkR GBUB <  if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ  whenδ approaches 1. 
Proof. The proof immediately follows from comparing interest rates in equations (16a) 
and (16b), and in (17a) and (17b), respectively. 
It can be easily seen that the first inequality results in a larger γ  than the second one. 
Consequently, banks can charge a higher interest rate to known good than to unknown 
customers at a lower fraction of good borrowers if customers are thrifty. In case customers 
discount future benefits to a large extent, banks need a larger fraction of good borrowers to 
be able to charge higher interest rates to known good than to unknown customers. 
As the former proposition demonstrates, banks will “rip off” known good customers.15 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If banks do not share information about 
good customers—which implies that good borrowers of a bank cannot credibly prove to 
other banks that they repaid their loan before—then each bank is a monopolist in its market 
segment of old good borrowers. Consequently, banks can and will charge the monopoly rate 
to their old good customers. The monopoly rate is only constrained by the customers’ 
valuation and by the interest rate other banks ask from unknown borrowers. The higher the 
banks price their loan to old good borrowers the larger fraction of these borrowers go and 
borrow at other banks as unknowns. Meanwhile, banks compete for unknown borrowers 
who can be new or old. Thus, the market is larger and competition is fiercer in the market 
segment of unknown customers than in the monopolistic segment of a bank’s market. More 
vicious competition exerts a downward pressure on interest rates banks can ask from 
unknown customers. In other words, old good borrowers are “informationally captured” by 
                                                        
15 If banks operated with different marginal costs, the more cost-efficient bank would charge a lower 
interest rate to its unknown customers than the less efficient one: 
)(11)( jR
cc
kR
U
b
jkU
b =+−<+−= γγ
γ
γγ
γ
 if jk cc < . But the low-cost bank would ask a higher 
interest rate from its known good borrowers than the high-cost bank: 
)(
22
1
22
1)( jR
cccc
kR
G
b
jkjkG
b =++>++= γ
γ
γγ
γ
γ . It means that the more efficient—and usually 
larger—bank would “rip off” its known good customers even more eagerly than the less efficient and 
smaller one. 
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their original bank because these customers cannot carry their good reputation over to other 
banks.16 
We have seen before that the interest rates borrowers pay will be the lowest when the 
discount factor is close to 1. I shall assume that 1~δ  when I compare banks’ market shares 
and profits under different systems of information sharing. 
Banks’ profit with bad information sharing will consist of two parts: the first part is 
poaching profit that banks attain from good customers who switch banks in their second 
period. The second part is profit from own known good customers. Notice that banks earn 
zero profit on young unknown borrowers, 
for 0)1(1)1()( =−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=−−− ccckRUB γγγ
γγγγ . Total profit of the two banks in 
equilibrium will be: 
(18) 
 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
,1,2;2,1
,
8
11
4
1112)()()(
2
==
−++⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=+≠=
jk
cckkjk
G
B
U
BB γ
γ
γ
γγπππ
 
where )(kBπ  labels the bank’s total equilibrium profit with bad information sharing. 
Equilibrium profit is unique at all feasible values ofγ  and c .17 
                                                        
16 If bank k operated with a lower unit cost than bank j, that is, jk cc < would hold, then its market 
share among unknown customers would exceed bank j’s market share by γ
kjyy ccjsks
−=− )()( . 
Bank k will have a larger market share also among known good borrowers than bank j by the amount 
of 
( )
2
)1(
)()( kj
oo cc
jsks
−+=− γ , where )(kso  is bank k’s market share among old good customers 
in equilibrium. This is a smaller difference than bank k’s advantage over bank j in the market for 
unknown customers, if 1<γ . Finally, bank j, the less efficient bank, will gain a larger market share 
than bank k in the poaching market by:
( )
4
)3(
)()( kj
pp cc
ksjs
−−=− γ . 
It follows from the above analysis of interest rates and market shares that banks with a larger market 
share will be more driven to charge a higher interest rate to known good customers and let some of 
them go to other banks than banks with a smaller market share. In addition, smaller banks will poach 
more good customers from larger banks than vice versa. 
17 As mentioned above in footnote 8, the results are fairly general and could be easily extended to 
2>K  banks. Bank k’s market share in the market segment of unknown young borrowers would 
then become: 
2
1
)1(2
)()()()(
)(
1,1,
+−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−
=
∑∑
≠
++
≠
δ
δ
kj
U
tjk
U
t
U
t
kj
U
tjk
y
t
jRnkRkRjRn
ks , where jkn , is the 
fraction of those customers who borrow either from bank k or from bank j. Bank k’s market share on 
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We can conclude this part of the analysis that banks will not have an incentive to fiercely 
compete for good customers if they share information only about bad borrowers, for those 
customers are informationally captured by their original bank. Consequently, known good 
borrowers will pay a higher interest rate for the loan they acquire than unknown customers. 
Competition will be more vicious for young unknown borrowers and on the poaching 
market, for it makes sense for a certain group of a bank’s customers to switch to another 
bank during their second period in the market. In fact, we can witness fiercer competition 
for unknown customers in several countries where black listing is in place: banks offer a low 
“introductory rate” to new customers, while interest rates sneak upwards later when these 
customers will have already settled at the bank. 
 
4.2 FULL INFORMATION SHARING (“FULL LIST”) 
 
With full information sharing there will be two separate markets: one for known and one for 
unknown borrowers.18 In contrast to “bad information” sharing, known good customers 
cannot go to another bank as unknowns. Each bank will find the interest rate for unknown 
and for known borrowers separately. Also, customers choose from which bank to borrow 
when they are new, independent of their choice when they will grow “old.” 
It is important to emphasize that in the current framework—contrary to Fudenberg and 
Tirole (2000)—banks will not charge different interest rates to own good borrowers and 
known good borrowers who borrowed from another bank before if banks share full 
information. In principle, it would be feasible, but it is not in the banks’ interest to price 
discriminate between own known good borrowers and the known good borrowers of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the poaching market would be:∑
≠
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−
kj
G
t
U
t
jkt
jRkRnkjs
2
1)()(),(;0max ,1 . It can be easily 
obtained that the equilibrium interest rates for unknown customers with K banks and 
with 1~δ would be: KkckRUB ,...,2,1   ,1)( =+−= γγ
γ
. Banks would charge the following interest 
rates to known good borrowers: kjk
cn
kR kj
jk
G
B ≠∀∀
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++
=
∑
≠ ,,
2
1
)(
,
γ
γ
. These interest rates are 
basically identical to what we obtained with two banks. 
18 The market for unknown customers and for known good borrowers would be interconnected if 
banks applied price discrimination between own known good customers and the migrating known 
good customers of the other bank. But I prove in the Appendix (see Proposition A2) that such price 
discrimination cannot be the banks’ dominant strategy. 
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other bank under full information sharing. (See Proposition A2 and its proof in the 
Appendix.) 
Lemma 8: The marginal new (unknown) good customer will be indifferent between 
choosing bank k or bank j if: 
(19) 1,2;2,1,1)()( ** ==−+=+ jkjRkR UtUt θθ , from which immediately 
obtains: 
(20) 1,2;2,1,
2
1)()(
)( ==+−= jkkRjRks
U
t
U
ty
t . 
Lemma 9: Bank k’s market share among known good customers becomes in period t: 
(21) 1,2;2,1,
2
1)()(
)( ==+−= jkkRjRks
G
t
G
to
t . 
Finally, there won’t be a poaching market if banks share full information. Banks find the 
interest rate they charge to unknown borrowers by solving: 
(22) ( )ckRksk UtytUt
kRUt
−−−= )1()()()(max
)(
γγπ , 
while the interest rate they charge to known good customers obtains from: 
(23) ( )ckRksk GtotGt
kRGt
−= )()()(max
)(
γπ . 
The first order conditions of (22) and (23) yield: 
(24) 1,22,1,
2
1
2
)(
)( ==++= j;kcjRkR
U
tU
t γ , and 
(25) 1,22,1,
2
1
2
)(
)( ==++= j;kcjRkR
G
tG
t . 
Lemma 10: Both markets are in steady state from the start and the equilibrium interest 
rates become: 
(26) 2,1,1)( =+= kckRUF γ , and 
(27) 2,1,1)( =+= kckRGF , 
where )(kR
U
F  and )(kR
G
F  label, respectively, bank k’s equilibrium interest rate to unknown 
and to known good borrowers with full information sharing. 
Comparing equations (26) and (27) shows that, in contrast to bad information sharing, 
banks will charge lower interest rates to known than to unknown borrowers 
whenever 1<γ . That is, borrowers will be rewarded for good behavior under full 
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information sharing. This result is in line with intuition. Although banks cannot act as 
monopolists in either of the two market segments—they must compete for customers in 
both markets—known good customers cannot go to another bank and borrow as unknowns. 
And this fact softens competition among banks for unknown customers. But it doesn’t mean 
that good customers are better off with full than with bad information sharing. If we 
compare the steady state interest rates in (16b) and (17b) and in (26) and (27) it shows that 
the interest rates paid by unknown customers will always be higher with full information 
sharing than under bad information sharing. Known good borrowers will also pay higher 
interest rates under a full list than with a black list if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ , which is an unexpected 
result. (I discuss the intuition behind this outcome below.) Consequently, banks will gain, 
but customers will lose with a full list even at relatively low values of γ  (that is, at a 
relatively small fraction of good borrowers). 
Full information sharing differs from a black list from another important respect, too. 
Notably, the pool of unknown good customers will be smaller, but the pool of known good 
customers will be larger with full than with bad information sharing.19 
The most intriguing question is which information sharing system would banks support. 
Using the results from (26) and (27), banks’ profit with full information sharing becomes: 
(28) ( ) ( ) 1,2;2,1,1
2
11
2
1)()()( ===−++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=+= jkcccckkk GFUFF γγγγγπππ , 
where 2,1),( =kkFπ  denotes bank k’s profit from unknown and from known good 
borrowers with full information sharing in steady state. Notice, that the equilibrium will 
always be unique. Comparing (18) and (28)—that is, comparing respective market shares 
and interest rates net of marginal cost—shows that, banks attain higher expected profits 
with full than with bad information sharing. Based on the analysis above, we can formulate 
the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. Fully rational banks will always prefer full information sharing to a 
black list if the fraction of good customers,
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ . In case
c
c
+
+<
2
1γ , banks will share 
information only about bad borrowers. 
                                                        
19 If banks operated with different marginal costs, consequently, with different market shares, the 
lack of the poaching market would hurt small banks more than large ones, for small banks—that are 
more eager to poach other banks’ unknown good borrowers as we have seen before—would lose more 
in terms of poaching profit than large banks. 
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Customers, however, would be better off with bad than with full information sharing, 
for they pay higher interest rates with a full list than with a black list if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ . (See 
proof in the Appendix.) 
The result about interest rates is surprising for one would expect that sharing full 
information triggers intensive competition among banks and stronger competition 
unequivocally leads to lower interest rates to all borrowers. But with full information 
sharing, known good customers cannot leave their bank and go to another bank as 
unknowns, nor can young unknown customers remain and borrow as unknowns in their 
second period in the market. Banks will know that a good customer spends her last period 
in the market, while unknown borrowers cannot be but young. Hence, banks use this 
information to charge higher interest rates to known and to unknown borrowers than with 
bad information sharing. In addition, since the two market segments are fully separated 
under a full list, the interest rates charged by a bank’s competitors in one market segment 
do not have a dampening effect on this bank’s interest rate on the other market segment as 
was the case under a black list. We can conclude this section that full information sharing 
softens rather than facilitates competition among banks. Consequently, customers lose 
while banks gain with a full list.20 
Banks would benefit from full information sharing, provided that all banks submit their 
customer files to a credit register or to credit bureaus, for they earn higher expected profits 
with a full than with a black list. We could observe this in several advanced countries, 
especially in the US, until recently. The question remains, why have some large banks been 
reluctant to share customer information in the US in recent years, and why is it so 
cumbersome to introduce a full list in several emerging markets? I address these issues in 
the next section. 
 
                                                        
20 Full information sharing can impose additional harm on customers if banks become “overly 
confident” by having access to the files of all borrowers, and they “over-lend” customers because of 
competition, as it has happened, for instance, in the US sub-prime loan market, but also in several 
Eurozone countries recently. 
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4.3 NO INFORMATION SHARING AND INFORMATION SHARING ONLY ABOUT 
GOOD BORROWERS 
Any form of information sharing adds a cooperative element to the banks’ competition. 
Based on conventional wisdom we would expect that banks will cooperate in order to attain 
higher profits. But I shall show that this is not always the best choice banks can make. 
With no information sharing, old bad customers may go to a bank they have not yet 
banked with. Known good customers may also visit another bank as unknowns. Hence, 
good customers allocate themselves across banks the same way as with “bad” information 
sharing. But the banking sector faces more bad customers now than with full or with bad 
information sharing. The fraction of bad customers who will patronize bank k in period t 
will be: 
(29) ( ) ( ))(2)1)(()(1)1)(()1)(( 11 ksksksksks ytytytytyt −− −−=−−+− γγγ . 
As can be seen from equation (29), the number of bad customers who visit bank k 
cannot be smaller now than with information sharing only about bad borrowers. If two 
banks operate in the market, equation (29) becomes: 
(30) ( ) ( ) 2,1,)()(1)1()(1)1()()1( 11 =+−−=−−+− −− kksksksks ytytytyt γγγ . 
From now on, I shall use this equation. 
Bank k’s profit and its continuation profit from unknown borrowers becomes in period 
t: 
(31)
( ) ( ) ( )
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Bank k’s profit in (31) is a difference equation of third order. Solving the first order 
condition for steady state values yields: 
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(32)
( ) ( ) 0
)1(4
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. 
In case the discount factor is close to one, the equilibrium interest rates for unknown 
borrowers will be the same as in (16b): 
(33) 2,1,1)( =+−= kckRUN γγ
γ
, 
where )(kR
U
N denotes the equilibrium value of the interest rate bank k will charge to 
unknown customers under no information sharing. 
Known good customers pay the same interest rate as with a black list: 
( ) 2,1,
2
1
2
1)( =++= kckRGN γ
γ
γ . Bank’s profit from unknown customers will obviously be 
smaller than under a black list for banks lose more on bad borrowers with no information 
sharing than with a black list. Consequently, banks’ profit with no information sharing is 
always lower than with bad or with full information sharing. 
PROPOSITION 3. No information sharing cannot be a bank’s dominant strategy if 
banks are fully rational and maximize long-term profits. 
Proof. The proof immediately follows from Proposition 2, and from the fact that banks’ 
profit will be lower with no information sharing than with a black list because of a larger 
fraction of bad customers who are able to borrow in both periods. Q.e.d. 
As we have just seen, fully rational banks would never opt for no information sharing, 
but myopic banks may do so.  No information sharing has a special appeal to banks: the 
number of bad borrowers a bank receives will fluctuate period by period. That is, a bank 
with a large market share may receive a larger mass of bad customers in the current period, 
but the young bad borrowers of this bank will go to other banks in the next period. Thus, a 
bank that has more bad customers now can “poison” the customer base of its competitors 
during the next period. 
Finally, it will not be feasible to the banks to choose information sharing only about 
good customers, for large and small banks cannot agree on such a system of information 
sharing.21 We can formulate the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4. Banks with different marginal costs (and market shares) will not 
choose to implement information sharing only about good borrowers. See proof of 
Proposition 4 in the Appendix. 
                                                        
21 With regard to a white list, banks can “only agree to disagree.” See Robert J. Aumann (1976). 
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We can conclude that banks’ optimum strategy is to share full information if the fraction 
of bad borrowers is not substantial in the market. Good customers lose more with no 
information sharing than with full information sharing, while they pay higher interest rates 
with full information sharing than with a black list. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have found that full information sharing would be in the banks’ interest if the fraction of 
good borrowers is sufficiently large. Implementing full information sharing on a private 
credit market may also serve as a long-term strategic device that contains the mass and 
fraction of future bad borrowers on the market. Banks would also favor a full list to a black 
list for they can charge higher interest rates and earn higher profits with the former than 
with the latter. 
The analysis can be extended in several directions. First, if banks operated with different 
marginal costs then large banks would have different incentives to information sharing than 
small ones. Large banks would gain more than small banks from full information sharing in 
terms of profits, if the fraction of good borrowers is large in the private credit market. But in 
case banks can expect a substantial fraction of bad borrowers, large banks will opt for bad 
information sharing. The conflicting interest of banks with different sizes may partly explain 
that we do not see full information sharing schemes in many of the emerging markets. 
These countries usually implement a black list on a mandatory basis instead. 
Secondly, I only focused on issues similar to the problem of adverse selection. Allowing 
for a positive probability of good customers’ default, that is, incorporating moral hazard in 
the analysis would render the issue of systemic risk in bank lending also tractable. 
Thirdly, I have shown that with endogenously derived default decisions of borrowers a 
fraction of “bad” customers will also have an interest to act strategically and repay their loan 
with interest in the first period. Bad customers’ incentive to repay equally holds for full and 
for bad information sharing, but it does not apply if there is no information sharing among 
banks or they only share good information. Fewer defaults result in a deeper financial 
market and lower interest rates for repaying borrowers. 
However, finally, a deeper market does not alter the fact that full information sharing 
leads to higher interest rates than a black list. I have shown that full information sharing 
has the most negative consequences to good borrowers. Good borrowers would be better off 
with a black list than with a full list for they must pay a higher interest rate with full 
information sharing than under a black list. If governments put a larger weight on consumer 
welfare than on banks’ profits, they will choose a scheme of bad information sharing rather 
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than a full list. It follows from the above argument that regulatory agencies could have an 
important role to play in shaping the private credit markets. 
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APPENDIX 
 
PROPOSITION A1. Fully rational banks will not charge a uniform interest rate to 
unknown and to known good customers with bad information sharing. 
 
Proof. With a uniform interest rate bank k maximizes the following profit, including 
continuation profit in period t: 
(A1) ( )( ) ( )ckRksckRksckRksk tyttyttytt −+−+−−−= −+ )()()()()1()()()( 11 γγδγγπ . 
The first order condition by )(kRt yields: 
(A2) 0
)1(2)1(2
11
)1(2
)(
)(
2
)(
)1(2
)()( 111 =−+−
−++−−−+−
− +−−
γδγδ
γ
δ
δ
δ
cjRkRjRkRjR ttttt . 
Solving (A2) for steady state values gives: 
(A3) γδγδ
γ
δ
δ
δ
δ
)23()23(
1
23
)1(2)(
23
)1(2)( −+−
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⎛
−
−= cjRkR . 
 
Assuming that 1~δ obtains: 
(A4) 2,1,1)( =+−= kckR γγ
γ
, 
which is the same interest rate banks would charge to unknown customers with price 
discrimination. Bank k’s profit in steady state becomes: 
(A5) 
( )
2
1)1()( ck +−= γπ . 
Profits with price discrimination will be in steady state: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2,1,
8
)1(1
4
1)1(12)()()(
2
=−+++−−=+≠= kcckkjk GuB γ
γ
γ
γγπππ  
as presented in equation (18) above. Comparing profits with uniform pricing as given in 
equation (A5) and profits with price discrimination between unknown and known good 
borrowers as in equation (18) above shows that the former is smaller than the latter one 
if
( )
2
1~11 2
22
c
cc −+−−>γ . Q.e.d. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Comparing )(kBπ in (18) and )(kFπ in (28) shows that banks 
earn larger profits with full than with bad information sharing if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ  for the 
following reasons: 
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• Banks earn zero profits on young unknown customers under a black list: 
( ) 2,1,0)1(1)()()()( ==⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ +−=−= kccksckRksk yUyUB γγγ γγγπ . 
• Banks’ profit in the poaching market with information sharing only about bad 
customers 
becomes:
( ) ( ) ( )( )ccckRcckRksk UBUBppB +−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ ++−=−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ ++−=−= 114 )1(4 12)(4 )1(4 12)()()( γγγγγγγγγγγπ
, while banks’ profit on unknown customers under a full list will be: 
( )( )
2
1)()()( γγγπ =−−−= ckRksk UGyUG . Since unit profit on the poaching market under a 
black list is ( )( )c+− 11 γ , while it isγ  in the market for unknown borrowers under a full 
list, it immediately obtains that ( )( ) γγ <+− c11  if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ . Now we just need to show 
that 
2
1
4
)1(
4
12)( <⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−= γ
γ
γ
γ cks p . After rearranging we get: γ<−
c
11 . Since 1≤c , the 
former inequality will always hold. 
• The interest rate banks charge to known good borrowers —consequently, unit 
profit—will be higher under a full list than under a black list if 
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ , as I have shown 
above. Banks’ market share in the market segment of known good customers with a black 
list is
2
1
4
)1(
4
21)( +−+−= γ
γ
γ
γ ckso , while it is 
2
1)( =kso  under a full list. Thus, banks serve 
more known good borrowers under a full list than under a black list 
if
2
1
2
1
4
)1(
4
21 <+−+− γ
γ
γ
γ c
, which simplifies to
c
c
+
+>
2
1γ . 
We can conclude that banks will earn larger profits with full information sharing than 
with information sharing only about bad borrowers under fairly general conditions. 
 Finally, comparing the interest rates in (16) and (17), and in (26) and (27) that banks 
charge to unknown and to known borrowers under bad and under full information 
sharing, respectively, proves that both unknown and known good borrowers pay higher 
interest rates under full information sharing than with a black list. Q.e.d. 
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PROPOSITION A2. The solution of the difference 
equation 0
2
)()(
2
3)( 11 =++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− −+ CkRkRkR
U
tU
t
U
t δδ
δ
, is unique and stable and it converges to 
steady state. 
PROOF: The characteristic equation of the above difference equation is given by 
0
2
1
2
32 =+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− δδ
δ mm . Since 0
2
1
2
3
4
1 2 >−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
δδ
δ
 holds for any value of 0>δ , equation  
has a unique solution in real numbers.22 The solution of the difference equation is stable 
and converges to steady state if the solution of the characteristic equation is smaller than 
unity. It can be seen that this condition is met if 2<δ . Q.e.d. 
 
PROPOSITION A3. It cannot be a bank’s dominant strategy to charge different prices to 
own known good customers and to known good customers of the other bank if banks share 
full information. 
 
PROOF: Denote the interest rate bank k charges to known good borrowers who migrated 
from bank j )(ˆ kRGt in period t. Then the marginal unknown good customer will be the 
person for whom: 
(A6)  
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Applying the same argument as in equation (7) we have: 
(A7)  
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Bank k’s profit from unknown borrowers will be in period t: 
(A8) ( ) 2,1),()1()()( =−−−= kksckRk ytUtUt γγπ , 
while the bank’s profit from own known good customers becomes: 
(A9) ( ) 1,2;2,1,
2
1)()(ˆ
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⎜⎜⎝
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G
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and profit from known good customers of the other bank obtains: 
(A10) ( ) 1,2;2,1,
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22 See, for instance, Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995), p. 751. 
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The first order condition of (A8) yields: 
(A11) 1,2;2,1,0
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From the first order condition of (A9) we have: 
(A12) 1,2;2,1,0
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Finally, the first order condition of (A10) gives: 
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Solving the system of equations in (A11)–(A13) for steady state values and 1~δ yields: 
(A14) 
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Comparing )(kR
U
in equation (A14) with )(kR
U
in equation (26) shows that banks charge 
higher interest rates to unknown borrowers and earn higher profits from these customers 
without than with price discrimination between own known good customers and known 
good customers of the other bank. 
 Since )()(ˆ kRkR
GG <  if 
c
c
75
4
+>γ , that is, if 3
1>γ  when 1~c  at the extreme, as can 
be seen from (A14), it will suffice to show that )(kR
G
will be smaller with than without 
price discrimination between own known good customers and known good customers of 
the other bank. )(kR
G
in (A14) will be smaller than )(kR
G
in equation (27) if 
cc +<+ 1
10
75
. This condition will be satisfied at any values of c. Consequently, banks earn 
lower profits on known good customers with than without price discrimination. Q.e.d. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: If banks shared only good information there would be two 
separate markets: one for unknown and one for known good clients. Bank k’s profit from 
unknown borrowers would become in period t: 
(34) ( ) ( ) ( )cksckRksk ytUtytUt +−−−−−−= − 1)1()(1)1()()()( 1 γγγπ , 
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as with no information sharing, while bank k would earn the following profit from known 
good borrowers: 
(35) ( )ckRksk GtotGt −= )()()( γπ , where 2 1)()()( +−= kRjRks
G
t
G
to
t . 
Solving (34) and (35) for equilibrium values with 1~δ  yields the following interest rates: 
(36) 2,1,)2(21)( =−+−= kckRUG γ
γ
γ
γ
, 
where )(kR
U
G denotes the interest rate bank k will charge to unknown customers with 
information sharing only about good borrowers. The interest rates charged to known 
good customers will be the same as in (27): 
(37) 2,1,1)( =+= kckRGG . 
The interest rates charged to unknown customers with a black list, as given in equation 
(16b) will be higher than the interest rates in (36) if: 
c
c−−> 1γ . This condition will 
always be satisfied. Since banks receive more bad customers with a “white list” than with 
a black list, their profit from unknown borrowers will be lower in the former case than in 
the latter. Banks’ profit from known good customers will be identical with full information 
sharing and with a white list. But we have seen that full information sharing dominates 
information sharing only about bad borrowers under fairly general conditions. 
Consequently, full information sharing also dominates information sharing only about 
good borrowers. Q.e.d. 
 
